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Jordan Alexander stein
harm’s Way: tragic responsibility 
and the novel form by sandra 
macpherson. Baltimore, md: 
Johns hopkins university press, 
2010. pp. 237. $55.00 cloth.
harm’s Way takes issue with the one 
thing everybody knows about the 
novel; namely, that it is a vehicle—
indeed, the vehicle—for the rise of 
bourgeois individualism. Famously 
outlined in the 1950s by ian Watt’s 
the rise of the novel (1957) and 
enriched since the 1980s by marx-
ists, feminists, and Foucaultians, 
this dominant story aligns the eng-
lish novel with the development of 
psychology, the rise of companion-
ate marriage, and the actualiza-
tion of modern personhood—in 
short, with what harm’s Way des-
ignates succinctly as the “interior-
ity thesis” (16). But the only thing 
more succinct than harm’s Way’s 
designations is its dispatch. in five 
short chapters, the book makes an 
impressively bold and impeccably 
graceful case against the idea that 
the realist novel can and should be 
considered the vehicle for which it 
has so long been taken. 
instead, harm’s Way argues 
that “[t]he realist novel is a proj-
ect of blame not exculpation” (13). 
unfolding from this claim is an 
intervention into the ways that crit-
ics of the novel have been oriented 
to the idea of action. harm’s Way 
contends that the widely accepted 
view that characters drive plots 
through their actions (a view that 
grants agency to human figures 
and so complies with the interior-
ity thesis) is ultimately a “comic” 
orientation, exemplified in the sen-
timental novel that terminates in 
marriage. the book accordingly 
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shows comedy to be a narrative 
form of limited liability, such that 
the responsibility a character as-
sumes (and should assume) for 
her or his actions is tempered by 
subjective issues, including things 
like intention, moral disposition, 
or states of affection and desire. in 
comedy, good intentions cancel bad 
actions (and thus comedy, the book 
notes in a typically and wryly styl-
ish moment, “means never having 
to say you’re sorry” [15]). Alterna-
tively, harm’s Way posits a “tragic” 
orientation to action in the novel, 
in which character is “an effect of 
the action” (8, emphasis retained) 
rather than the other way around; 
or again, in which “character hap-
pens to and does not usher from 
persons” (174). this formal point 
manifests in narratives of strict (as 
opposed to limited) liability—nar-
ratives which assume that “inte-
rior” issues such as intention or the 
goodness of a person (or character) 
are irrelevant to the formal condi-
tion of harm that persons (or char-
acters) may produce. Far from rec-
ognizing persons for their interior 
depths, harm’s Way shows that 
strict liability recognizes persons as 
“causes rather than agents,” “mat-
ter in motion,” (165, 23, emphasis 
retained). But, ultimately an ar-
gument about responsibility, the 
book assures its reader that “if this 
is quite literally dehumanizing, it 
is not, therefore, inhumane” (23). 
While harm’s Way grants out 
of hand that strict liability is not 
evident in all eighteenth-century 
British novels—that it is, in fact, 
“a liberal countertradition” (4)—
the book’s wager that accounts of 
strict liability are present in texts 
as foundational to the study of the 
english novel as moll flanders, 
roxanna, and clarissa leaves one 
wondering how “counter” this tra-
dition can ultimately be. And that, 
surely, is the point, as harm’s Way 
proceeds by handling the most 
apposite case studies (e.g., defoe, 
richardson, and Fielding) in the 
most strikingly counterintuitive 
ways. to be sure, the book opens 
up new readings of familiar texts 
by defoe and richardson, but 
the standout example is the third 
chapter on Fielding, whose Joseph 
Andrews and tom Jones conform 
so well to the book’s understand-
ing of the comic version of the 
realist novel, and contrast so strik-
ingly with richardson especially, 
that they are used to demonstrate 
the book’s claims in reverse. the 
unusualness of this move makes 
it worth pausing over, for nearly 
a fifth of harm’s Way’s narrative is 
devoted to the rigorous discussion 
and ultimate assimilation of texts 
that, avowedly, do not themselves 
prove its point. if few arguments 
would attempt such a daring turn, 
many fewer could sustain it as 
well as this book does, and even 
a reader who could somehow fail 
to appreciate the theoretical reach 
of the book’s claims or the deftness 
of its close readings could not fail 
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to admire the sheer fearlessness of 
the book’s style of argumentation. 
A final chapter on Frances 
sheridan’s memoirs of miss sid-
ney Bidulph pushes the argument’s 
feminist implication, “to uncouple 
harm from nonconsent” (146). 
such an uncoupling demonstrates 
that one can be “impelled” to an 
action that one then performs and 
for which one is therefore respon-
sible, without having needed to 
make a conscious choice or to ex-
press something about one’s self. 
this relatively simple point has 
startlingly complex implications, 
underscored by the dicey example 
of male rape, where bodily game-
ness is often recognized as equal 
to consent. And while an erection 
may not, of course, necessarily be a 
sign of consent, harm’s Way takes 
a different track, arguing instead 
that consent is irrelevant not just 
to rape but to sexual activity of all 
kinds. Advancing the position that 
one is “responsible for what he 
cannot help but have done” (150), 
harm’s Way assigns responsibility 
to all who happened to be party to a 
harm, victim and perpetrator alike, 
regardless of what anyone wanted 
or meant to do. the strict assign-
ment of responsibility for action 
in this chapter ties together prior 
threads of argument (that rox-
anna is in part responsible for the 
death of her daughter; that clarissa 
is in part responsible for her rape) 
in order to show that this account-
ing for responsibility—“We are 
responsible, though we are not at 
fault” (49)—offers a radically for-
malist way of reckoning a politics 
(and an ethics) of gender equity. 
the novels under discussion, like 
the legal logic of strict liability with 
which they contend, show us that 
“[i]n exchange for the exigencies of 
embodiment, literature offers the 
compensations of form” (174). 
if such claims sound unlike any 
one may elsewhere have encoun-
tered in a field as densely populated 
as the history of the novel, that 
innovation is entirely to harm’s 
Way’s credit. But though i sincerely 
admire the book’s creativity and ac-
complishment, though i am certain 
that anyone working in the field 
will have to contend with it, i admit 
that i hesitate to feel entirely per-
suaded by it. Without a doubt, the 
book’s wonderful readings do have 
me convinced that strict liability is 
far more of an intellectual context 
for the eighteenth-century Brit-
ish novel than i ever might have 
thought. But the political dimen-
sion of the argument, the idea that 
intentions ought to be irrelevant to 
actions, i am slower to accept. As 
it develops this point, harm’s Way 
rather heroically argues that its 
unyielding theory of responsibil-
ity—and the aesthetic formalism 
that, the book also demonstrates, 
aligns with strict liability—gener-
ates a powerful counterargument 
to forms of privilege grounded in 
the body (specifically, in sex and 
species), and i certainly find this 
visionary move to be an attractive 
one. however, perhaps what makes 
it attractive, rather than persuasive, 
is the absoluteness of its presenta-
tion. the lockstep alignment of the 
book’s terms are entirely compel-
ling within the book’s argument, 
but not as plausible when one 
considers examples on which the 
book’s argument does not touch. it 
is difficult to imagine, for instance, 
that texts like Pamela or robinson 
crusoe depict characters as causes 
rather than agents. While harm’s 
Way may wish to classify these as 
comedic texts, rather than tragic 
ones working through a logic of 
strict liability, it nevertheless seems 
to me that the strongly christian 
motifs in these novels, which de-
velop and reward the refinement 
of interior states, are also legible 
in a more clearly tragic novel like 
clarissa. And though i suppose 
that the presence of strict liability in 
clarissa does not preclude the pos-
sibility that the text is simultane-
ously concerned with other means 
of imagining action, one does not 
get the sense reading harm’s Way 
that it is possible to have a lenient 
account of strict liability. 
Be that as it may, there is no 
conclusion one can have about this 
book other than that it is the finest 
kind of literary criticism—remark-
ably lively, thoroughly researched, 
cogently argued, and brilliantly 
counterintuitive. And generous. 
For as we engage seriously with the 
book’s argument about strict liabil-
ity, we might happily discover that 
we too are perhaps responsible for 
something this truly great. 
Jordan Alexander stein teaches english at 
the university of colorado at Boulder.
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